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A RETRIBUTIVE THEORY OF THE PARDONING POWER?
Hugo Adam Bedau*
[M]ercy is . .. an attribute of God himself..., in the course of

justice, none of us shall see salvation. We do pray for mercy..
[M]itigate the justice of thy plea.'
During the past two decades; the retributive theory of punishment has made remarkable strides in recapturing the affections of
penologists. The story has been told elsewhere and need not be
reviewed here. For philosophers, if not for others interested in the
theory and practice of punishment, a retributive approach holds a
double attraction.
On one hand, basing punishment on retribution supposedly
guarantees that punishment is based on justice, instead of on principles independent of justice or on nothing at all. What does "retribution" mean if not "deserved punishment?" And what does de3
served punishment yield if not justice?
On the other hand, basing punishment on retribution relieves
proponents of given punishments from relying on any empirical
consequences of the threat or infliction of the punishment, such as
public safety and rehabilitation of punished offenders, to justify
the punishment. Basing punishment on retribution also frees the
sentencer from having to know anything about the empirical consequences of punishing a deserving offender in one manner rather
than another. There are, to be sure, well-attested difficulties in the
* Austin Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, Tufts University.
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retributive theory of punishment.4 However, the theory's advocates
too infrequently acknowledge and even less frequently face and attempt to resolve these problems. These difficulties apart, it remains true that the retributive theory currently rules the penological roost and no successor is yet in sight.
There are, of course, many differences among retributivists. The
best known concerns whether the penalty schedule ought to be
designed to mirror the gravity of the wrong inflicted on the innocent, or whether (more modestly) it ought to be designed only to
impose deprivations proportional in their severity to the gravity of
the crime. 5 Another difference, of more importance here and to
which insufficient attention has been paid, concerns the locus and
scope of retributive principles as they bear on the construction of
penal policy.
Consider the familiar division of governmental powers among
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and the relevance
of these divisions to the development and implementation of penal
policy. As punishment under law is inseparably wedded to sentencing, and as sentencing is a time-honored judicial office, the central
core of retributivism might be called judicial retributivism. Under
this view, only sentencing (carried out by the judiciary) is controlled by retributive considerations. Accordingly, it is the duty of
sentencing judges to mete out punishments according to the desert
and nothing but the desert of the convicted offender. Never mind
for the present how the sentencer arrives at the knowledge of what
this desert is.
At the extreme, the judiciary might establish a sentence as deserved in either of two ways. First, the legislature may give complete discretion to the judiciary to decide sentences entirely on a
case by case basis. This means that each judge figures out as best
he or she can what punishment the defendant awaiting sentencing
deserves. The second method leaves no room for judicial discretion. Instead, the legislature draws up a rigid penalty schedule that
determines in advance what penalty is appropriate for each crime.
4. HUGO A. BEDAU, Retribution and the Theory of Punishment, 75 Jour. Phil. 601 (1978);

H.L.A.

HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
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5. For a discussion of lex talionis and proportionality by retributivists, see DAVIS, supra
note 2, at 42-68; IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 80-81 (1989). See also
MARVIN HENBERG, RETRIBUTION: EVIL FOR EVIL IN ETHICS, LAW, AND LITERATURE
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There is an infinite array of variations between these two sentencing extremes. If, however, a sentencing policy approaches the
latter extreme, then judicial retributivism is reduced to "mechanical jurisprudence," or "slot machine justice," meting out rigidly
prescribed punishments whose retributive merit depends entirely
on legislative retributivism;that is, on the extent to which the penal schedule as drawn up by the legislature itself reflects purely
retributive considerations. If, on the other hand, the sentencing
policy approaches the other extreme, the legislature plays virtually
no role in providing retributive guidelines for judicial
retributivism.
Somewhere between these two extremes stands the view championed in the 1950s, and of considerable influence ever since, in
which the legislature pursues broadly utilitarian goals in designing
the penal policy yet leaves case-by-case sentencing entirely in the
hands of judges who may be as retributive within those limits as
they desire."
Executive retributivism is not required by judicial or legislative
retributivism. The relevant tasks of the executive are to enforce
the criminal law and to use the clemency power to modify judicially imposed deserved punishment by means of reprieves, commutations, and pardons. Retributive considerations in arrest and
prosecution can be ignored here. Given the infrequency of executive clemency, executive retributivism plays at best a relaiively minor role. Judicial retributivism is essential in implementing a retributive penal policy. Both legislative and executive retributivism
expand the scope of judicial retributivism and may be added or
dropped as theory and policy preferences dictate.
There are two reasons for confining retributivism in punishment
to the narrow scope of judicial retributivism. First, legislative retributivism - the construction of the penalty schedule - is necessarily arbitrary in fitting the graduated scale of crimes ranked by
differences in gravity with the graduated scale of punishments
ranked by differences in severity.7 Resolving this arbitrariness by
taking into account non-desert oriented considerations such as
6. See HART, supra note 4, at 3, 8-13; Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 44 PHIL. REv. 281

(1955).
7. BEDAU, supra note 4, at 611-15

(criticizing ANDREW vON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE
CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF INCARCERATION
(1976). See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILLIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 174-75 (1990); NICOLE LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT". POLITI-
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public safety is reasonable and perhaps inevitable, so long as there
is reason to believe that the best way to prevent recidivism is to
keep offenders in custody longer than what desert alone requires.
Taking into account non-desert oriented considerations however, is
fatal to the pretensions of any penalty schedule advanced as being
retributive. The second reason that retributivism should be confined to judicial retributivism is that executive retributivism requires indifference to all moral principles other than those that define retributive desert, a self-denial most executives would find
intolerable.8
Confining retributive principles to judicial acts and responsibilities relevant to punishment is likely to strike the true believer in
retribution as wholly unsatisfactory. If some form of the retributive theory of punishment is necessary, why allow judicial retributivism to risk frustration by nonretributive considerations freely
employed by the legislature and the executive? It is not surprising,
therefore, to see Kathleen Dean Moore, who endorses a retributive
theory of punishment, prefacing her study of the proper exercise of
the pardon power by declaring: "My central theme is that acts of
pardon need to be justified, and that their justification is to be
found in the very principles of retributive justice which make it
reasonable to punish in the first place." 9 My task in the rest of
these remarks is to assess whether executive retributivism - the
exercise of executive powers regarding criminal justice solely by
reference to retributive principles - is reasonable, or the best we
can do.
Lest there be any misunderstanding, let me begin by declaring
that I, too, believe "acts of pardon need to be justified." Indeed, it
would be odd to find anyone who disagrees with this claim. It
should go without saying, or at least without emphasis, that any
exercise of, or refusal to exercise, the pardoning power requires justification, if only because acts of executive pardon are no different
from other executive, judicial, or legislative acts. In each case those
who take action are responsible, in one way or another, to their
26 (1988); NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? 101-05
(1991).
8. Evidence is readily found for this conclusion in the research on executive clemency in
capital cases. See, e.g., Elkan Abramowitz & David Paget, Executive Clemency in Capital
Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 136 (1964); Michael L. Radelett & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive
Clemency in Post-Furman Capital Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 289 (1993).
9. MOORE, supra note 3, at vii. Contra DAvIS, supra note 2, at 91-92 (explicitly rejecting
executive retributivism).
CAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES
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superiors or to the electorate who authorize them to exercise such
powers. A person who has the authority to alter the legal relation
of another person (that is, to exercise a Hohfeldian "power")' 0 is
subject in principle to challenge whenever that power is exercised,
whether by act or omission. This assertion is true on any theory of
responsible government compatible with liberal constitutional
democracy.
One might think that clemency requires special justification because it involves the executive overridingthe decision of the judiciary and thus flirts with ignoring the principle of the separation of
powers - something not to be done lightly. By definition, however,
any exercise of the clemency power lightens the burden placed on a
convicted offender. Such relief requires less justification than many
other official acts, since it employs a familiar principle attractive to
liberal political theory, i.e., that absent any overriding reason to
the contrary, the government should always employ the least restrictive means to achieve its presumably valid objectives." These
conflicting policies leave quite open what counts as the justification
for an act of pardon and what distinguishes the good and bad
grounds of justification.
The first thing to notice about a professing retributive theory of
pardons built on a general theory of retribution in punishment is
that the occasion for exercise of the retributive pardoning power
arises only from a failure of retribution at the prior judicial sentencing level. There are two main reasons that retributivism might
fail at the sentencing level. First, judges who do not believe in retributive sentencing are likely to mete out sentences that fail to
give convicted offenders the punishment they retributively deserve.
Second, judges who do believe in retributive sentencing may nonetheless for various reasons, mete out sentences nonetheless that
fail to accord with what convicted offenders retributively deserve.
The second thing to notice is that executive retributivism is confined to downward revisions in the severity of punishments. The
exercise of clemency always yields mitigation or alleviation in
10. WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REA-

7-8 (1919).
11. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964), cited in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965); see also Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism,in MORALITY AND THE
LAW 107, 126 (Richard A. Wasserstrom ed., 1971); Ferdinand Schoeman, On Incapacitating
the Dangerous, 16 AM. PHm. Q. 27, 28 (1979).
SONING
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sentences. 2 Upward revisions in punitive severity are not within
the powers of the executive and are not part of the theory of executive retributivism. In short, executive retributivism is an asymmetrical power with respect to the severity of sentences.
Retributivists should object to this asymmetry.' 3 If they are confident that executives know what guilty offenders really deserve,
such that the executive may decrease punitive severity in a given
case, it follows that the executive also should have the power to
increase the severity of sentences too leniently imposed by courts,
in order to achieve the desired retributive results.
Failure by executive retributivism advocates to consider these
problems, if not mere oversight, can be justified only by admitting
that other considerations dominate demands for retribution in
punishment. What might these other considerations be? Perhaps
the following principle is one of these considerations: No offender
deserves a more severe punishment than the courts mete out, but
some offenders deserve a punishment less severe than the one they
received. This is true but trivial. It merely restates in different language the very asymmetry in executive retributivism we are trying
to explain. Another consideration might be that executive power to
increase the severity of court-awarded sentences on the grounds of
offender desert is more likely to be abused than executive power
confined to reduction in the severity of sentences. This is not so
much a principle as it is an empirical generalization. Is there any
ground to believe it?
There is another, radical, explanation. Executive clemency is not
necessarily tied to acts of sentence reduction designed to achieve
deserved punishments. Rather, executive clemency is a power of
mercy, and the sentence reductions that it provides are merciful
acts. Necessarily, there is no mercy in increasing the severity of
punishments. Nor is mercy constrained by retributive considerations. There is in fact no plausible theory of executive retributivism underlying the exercise of executive power to reduce sentences.
Therefore, retributivists ought to oppose the exercise of executive
clemency, except in those cases where they can justify the executive's act of mercy as what an ideally informed and motivated re12. MoonE, supra note 3, at 83 (defining "pardon" as "an act that alleviates or removes
the punishment for a crime."); cf. id. at 193 (providing alternative yet similar definition of
"pardon").
13. Moore does not mention this point. Id.
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tributive judge would have sentenced the offender to in the first
place. 4
I recognize that the foregoing paragraph is bold assertion, not
argument. In any case, a distinctly asymmetrical role for executive
retributivism remains in the rectification of failures of judicial retributivism. Retributivists must provide some explanation and justification for such an asymmetry, if the doctrine of executive retributivism is to thrive.
Against this background, let us look more closely at the retributivist theory of pardon. Kathleen Dean Moore devotes the central
section of her book to spelling out in considerable detail just what
executive retributivism would look like. Her view of the retributive
theory of pardon has, above all, the purpose of protecting judicial
retributivism, and thus preventing what Moore regards as justice
in sentencing from being undone by injustice in pardoning. She
holds that pardons not only can be, but must be, acts of "justice."' 5 They must also be "deserved."'" Thus, pardons cannot be
acts of "mercy"' 7 or "pity." 8 The consequence, although she does
not say this in so many words, is that an act of pardon is justified
if, and only if, the person pardoned deserves to be pardoned.
"[T]he pardoning power is abused when a pardon is granted for
any reason other than that punishment is undeserved."' 19 She sums
up her theory in these words ".

.

. [R]etributive justice specifies

two roles for pardons in a system of punishment: first, pardons are
necessary for people who face punishment even though they are
not liable to punishment; and second, pardons are permissible for
people who face punishment when they are liable to punishment
without morally deserving it."20
Moore finds four broad categories in which a person deserves to
be pardoned. In the first category stand the cases of punishment
undeserved on the grounds that the defendant is innocent.2' For

example, if the person punished has not been convicted of a crime
nor sentenced to any punishment, then the hardship inflicted on
14. Cf. DAViS, supra note 2, at 90-92 (expressing a similar view despite Davis' professed

judicial retributivism).
15. MooRE, supra note 3, at 129.
16. Id.

17. Id.
18. Id. at 167, 205.

19. Id. at 199.
20. Id. at 129.
21. Id. at 132-35. The three subcategories in the text are not found in Moore's discussion.
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the person cannot be deserved. In such cases, a necessary condition
of punishment ("liability," as she says or, as I prefer to say, eligibility for punishment) 22 has not been satisfied. There are also cases
where the person, although convicted and sentenced, is factually
innocent. In such cases, liability to punishment has been established by the usual methods, but with erroneous results. Finally,
within this category of innocent defendants, there are the cases
where the person, though guilty, convicted, and sentenced, was
convicted or sentenced unfairly by a violation of due process or of
equal protection of the laws.
Notice the diversity of these grounds. The unconvicted do not
conceptually, much less legally or morally, deserve to be punished,
as they have not been found guilty of anything.2 3 The wrongly convicted may well legally deserve the punishment they get, but only
because of the false belief that they are in fact guilty. Those convicted by violations of due process may well deserve the punishment they got - or so the retributivist would argue - but not
under the procedure or for the reasons that imposed it on them.
No uniform role for, or even concept of, desert is revealed in these
three kinds of cases of "undeserved" punishment.
Moore's second major category includes the cases of defendants
who are not entirely, wholly, or at all at fault for the harm they
have caused in violating the law. Insanity, mental retardation,
youth (all of which Moore treats as akin to innocence), 24 as well as
coerced and strict liability offenses and unsuccessful attempts, 5
provide a basis for showing that punishment in such cases is undeserved. The offender has an excuse that either partially or wholly
undercuts the ascription of criminal responsibility for the act. Such
an excuse entitles the convicted defendant to some degree of pardon. Depending on the character of the excuse, the deserved punishment ought to be either reduced via mitigation or altogether
nullified because it is wholly undeserved. That the punishment
22. Id. at 133. In Retribution and the Theory of Punishment, I allude to a distinction
between liability and eligibility for punishment, as follows: persons become liable to punishment once they are subject to a law that makes certain conduct a punishable offense. Persons become eligible for punishment if they are liable to punishment and are convicted of
committing an offense. BEDAU, supra note 4, at 604-05.
23. Standard definitions of punishment, even by philosophers who disavow retribution as
the rationale for the penalty schedule or as the general justification of the practice of punishment, reflect the retributivism expressed in the text. See, e.g., HART, supra note 4, at 5-6.
24. MOORE, supra note 3, at 138-41.
25. Id. at 144-46.
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ought to be reduced in such cases I readily agree. That it ought to
be reduced only because it was not "deserved" in the first place I
cannot accept.
Third, there are the cases where the offender's act, despite being
properly deemed in violation of the criminal law and therefore deserving punishment, is nonetheless morally justified. "[A] retributivist could justify pardoning a person who incites to riot in a
country in which revolution is, morally required. 2 After Prohibition ended, offenders were pardoned, and rightly so, because society "generally did not believe in the liquor laws and could see no
justification for punishing people for doing what was not believed
to be wrong. ' 27 Conscientious disobedience of the sort made famous by Thoreau, Tolstoi, Gandhi, and King is one sort of "moral
act" in which "the 'offender' has not done anything wrong and so
does not deserve to be punished. ' 2 Here I find Moore's position
verging on the paradoxical. Justified law breaking does not show
that no punishment is deserved; it shows only that the guilty offender ought not to be punished.
Finally, there is a heterogeneous set of considerations that require "adjustments" in the sentences judicially imposed.2 9 Some
guilty offenders may be deemed to have been "punished enough"
by adverse circumstances, and so warrant a release from further
punishment under law.30 The imminence of death for a felon serving a well-deserved prison term may warrant his release.3 1 Conscientious opposition to a harsh penalty, as when a governor who opposes the death penalty confronts a prisoner sentenced to die, may
warrant commuting a guilty prisoner to a lesser sentence.3 2 Moore
concedes that all these cases may look, at least at first glance, as
though they are "appeals to pity"; 33 but she claims all "can. . . be
understood as appeals to retributive justice." 34 I would add only
that I believe a closer look will show that none of these cases in
which reduction of sentence may well be justified are properly justified by reference to what the offender now, or really, "deserves."
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

157.
158.
161.
166-78.
166.
166-67.
167.
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As my objections show, I am unpersuaded by Moore's analysis.
We cannot infer from the fact that a given offender does not "deserve" a given sentence, that the offender does "deserve" the
mercy that a pardon brings. For it may be that the offender does
not "deserve" anything at all - or that although the offender does,
perhaps, deserve something, no one knows what it is.
In my criticisms of Moore's views about deserved pardon, I have
relied at several points on a contrast between what is and is not
deserved and what ought and ought not to be done. Let us take a
closer look at this contrast, for I think it is essential to ridding
ourselves of the grip that appeals to desert may have on our thinking. Assume some defendant (D 1) has been sentenced to a particular punishment (P 1 ) which is more severe than another punishment (P 2 ). We must distinguish between two different ways of
formulating the desirability of clemency, i.e., of advocating a reduction in D1 's sentence from P 1 to P 2:
(1) DI's sentence ought to be reduced from P 1 to P 2,
and
(2) D1 deserves P 2 , not P,.
We need to distinguish these two judgments for at least three reasons. First, whenever the executive retributivist is willing to assert
(1), that DI's sentence ought to be reduced, he is ready to argue:
(3) (1), the sentence ought to be reduced because (2), D1 deserves the less severe sentence.
But nonretributivists will, however, never assert (3), even though
they certainly are as willing to assert (1) as is any retributivist.
How do (1) and (2) really differ? Retributivists and nonretributivists agree that desert never rests on future events, but, rather on
settled, typically, past events. Desert is thus often said to be essentially a backward-looking concept,3 5 and the principles of desert
express this orientation. But the reasons one "ought" to do something are not confined to the past. These reasons may refer to future events whose certainty is in doubt. This point is especially
relevant where a clemency decision is based on beliefs in rehabilitation and little likelihood of recidivism. Indeed, as H.L.A. Hart
has observed, the use of the word "ought" in the typical case
35. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 2, at 14; Joel Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert, in
NoMos VI: JUSTICE 69, 72 (Pennock & Chapman eds., 1963); JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND
DESERT 55, 61 (1973); MOORE, supra note 3, at 125; SHER, supra note 3, at 4, 174-79 (discussing "antecedentialism"); VON HIRSCH, supra note 7, at 46.
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"merely reflects the presence of some standard of criticism".36

Where executive clemency is concerned, these "standards of criticism" are far broader than the backwardly oriented principles of
desert.
Second, executive retributivists are committed to ignoring, or
even rejecting, (1), except insofar as it appears in (3), where it is
conditional on desert. That is, the retributivist cannot make any
sense of, or grant any force to, assertions of what ought to be done
by way of punishment except on the ground of personal desert.
Put otherwise, proposition (3) is but the conclusion of the basic
retributivist syllogism: since convicted offenders ought to receive
retributive justice, and retributive justice consists in meting out
deserved punishments, offenders ought to get the punishments
they deserve. Actually, proposition (3) falls short of expressing the
tight connection between desert and what ought to be done, as the
retributivist sees it. 3 7 That connection is better expressed this way:
(3.1) (1), Di's sentence ought to be reduced from P 1 to P 2, only

because (2), D1 deserves P 2 , not P1 .
Third, we must not forget the views of the nonretributivists on
(2). They will balk at asserting (2); some will deny that (2) makes
any sense, others will grant that it makes sense but deny that it
should govern sentencing. They will reject (3) and a fortiori (3.1),
and so on.38 Nonretributivists will also insist on asking this question: Why should anyone hold the view that the only reasons for
extending clemency in any form are the backward-oriented reasons
that purportedly establish what the convicted offender "deserves"?
Why not allow clemency to be extended for any good reason, recognizing that there is no general criterion for what counts as a
36. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 69
(1983). Philosophers have devoted much attention to characterizing the sense of "ought,"
and while few anticipate or repeat Hart's comment, none contradicts it. See BERNARD GERT,
MORALITY: A NEW JUSTIFICATION FOR THE MORAL RULES 215-23 (1988); RICHARD M. HARE,
THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS 151-97 (1952); JOHN L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND
WRONG 73-80 (1977); PATRICK H. NOWELL-SMITH, ETHICS 190-97 (1954); JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 29-32 (1975); ROGER WERTHEIMER, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SENSE 77134 (1972).
37. See MOORE, supra note 3, at 93; see also DAVIS, supra note 2, at 128.
38. Just a word about the remaining possible way in which one might combine the ideas
in propositions (1) and (2), viz. in proposition (4): (2) because (1). Retributivists and nonretributivists will agree in rejecting (4) as essentially senseless. No one can be sensibly said to
deserve anything because he or she ought to get it.

593, 613 (1958) reprinted in H.LA.
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"good reason" in this or any other context? Good reasons abound,
but rigid criteria to define the concept do not.
I have deferred until now any direct criticism of executive retributivism. To do that, let us examine the executive retributivist's
reasons for exercising clemency in a particular case. The reasoning
goes like this:
(5) Defendant D, deserves punishment P 2(6) D1 was sentenced to P,.
(7) P1 is more severe than P 2.
(8) Executive authority to reduce sentences, the clemency power,
ought to be exercised solely in order to assure that defendants get
the punishments they deserve.
(9) Therefore, the executive ought to reduce DI's sentence from
P 1 to P 2.
Proposition (8) is a succinct statement of what we may call the
principle of executive retributivism as it bears on the clemency
power. The inference to proposition (9) amounts to interpreting
this principle by means of the argument for propositions (3) and
(3.1). Now the essential problem of executive retributivism lies in
answering two questions: First, what, exactly, is the punishment,
P 2, that the defendant deserves? So far, all we know about P 2 is
that (by hypothesis) it is less severe than P 1. Second, how is the
executive supposed to decide that the offender deserves P 2 rather
than any of the other alternatives to P 1, all of which share with P 2
the essential property of being less severe than Pi?
I believe the retributivist cannot answer either of these questions
without being arbitrary or vague. I reach this conclusion for two
independent reasons. First, it is an illusion to believe that one can
tell across the full range of permissible sanctions precisely which of
two alternative punishments is the more, and which is the less, severe. The illusion is encouraged by focusing on some obvious cases,
e.g., that death is more severe than life in prison, 39 or ten years in
prison is more severe than nine. But whether a $10,000 fine is
more, less, or equal in severity to one year in prison has no general
and precise answer.
39. For a discussion of how one might objectively argue that the death penalty is more
severe than life imprisonment, see Hugo A. Bedau, Imprisonment vs. Death: Does Avoiding
Schwarzschild's Paradox Lead to Sheleffs Dilemma?, 54 ALB. L. REV. 481, 487-90 (1990).
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Second, whether the question of appropriate punishment can be
answered even when applied to individual offenders is also dubious. The illusion that it can be is fostered by apparently clear
cases, e.g., we are inclined to agree that sentencing the wealthy
Ivan Boesky to a fine of $10,000 is less severe for him than a sentence of one year in prison. But even this judgment rests on assumptions that may be false, e.g., that the prison does not permit
conjugal visits, etc. Nor can we rely on the hypothesis that if an
offender declares a preference for a sentence, P 2, to any alternative, P 1 , then P 2 must be less severe than P 1 . Some offenders'
choice of punishment may be governed by perverse, guilt-ridden
preferences. Punishments do not always turn out to have the qualities that lead a given offender to declare a preference in advance
for one rather the another.
Assume, contrary to fact, that the foregoing uncertainties can be
solved in principle. Such a solution only paves the way to a second
problem. The executive has no advantage over the judge in determining what punishment the offender deserves, except under certain assumptions: (a) the executive has access to more information,
or information of a different kind, than does the sentencing judge,
which enables the executive to determine what the offender really
deserves; and (b) desert changes as circumstances change, so that
although the courts sentenced the offender to the punishment that
he indeed deserved then, what the offender deserves now is a less
severe sentence.
Neither of these assumptions is generally plausible. Assumption
(a) is implausible so long as the officials charged with preparing a
presentencing report for the judge or the jury do their jobs. After
all, the executive in deliberating the exercise of clemency will rely
on exactly the same sort of information as the court relied on at an
earlier stage. Assumption (b) is implausible for a more important
reason. As we noticed earlier, desert is a backward-looking concept.
Judgments of who deserves what are necessarily based on past
events about the crime, the criminal, the victim, and society. None
of these facts can change with the passage of time, so the offender's desert cannot change either. Of course, our beliefs about
what the defender deserves can change over time, but that merely
returns us to the argument over point (a). It adds nothing new to
the solution of the problem. I conclude that executive retributivism is just another exercise in guesswork papered over with brave
talk about deserved punishments.
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The very heart of darkness in every form of retributivism is the
construction of a penalty scale which measures what various offenders deserve for their offenses. There is no reason whatsoever to
believe that legislatures or sentencing judges can construct this
scale; or that although they cannot, executives in reviewing clemency applications can. What is the evidence that this problem is
unsolved and why does it appear to be insoluble?
I have no a priori argument upon which I can base my adverse
judgment on the claims of retributivism. However, one can point to
the diversity and inadequacies of all existing forms of the penalty
schedule proposed by retributivists. This has been done elsewhere
regarding Andrew von Hirsch's popular contemporary retributive
theory presented nearly twenty years ago. 40 He offered a conception of determinate sentencing based on retributive principles. The
actual penalty schedule he proposed, however, is easily seen to be
quite arbitrary. His principles were insufficient to enable him to
match the severity of punishments with the gravity of crimes except in the loosest way.
First, he had no retributive basis for anchoring the minimum
punishment at the foot of the penalty scale at any particular point.
Second, he had no retributive basis for putting a ceiling on the
maximum punishment provided at the top of the scale. Finally, he
had no retributive basis for choosing the intervals between degrees
of severity in the scale.4 1 For example, his retributive principles
could not, without appeal to political considerations or moral convictions of a nonretributive nature, determine whether the crime of
first-degree murder ought to be punished with a death penalty, life
imprisonment, some other term of imprisonment, or in a different
manner altogether.
In recent years, subsequent versions of retributivism have appeared on the scene that may have improved on the deficiencies of
von Hirsch's retributive theory. Consider, by way of illustration,
the views of Michael Davis, 42 perhaps the most vigorous and confident contemporary retributivist. However, I submit that examina40. VON HIRSCH, supra note 7. For criticism see BEDAU, supra note 4; Hugo A. Bedau,
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41. For a discussion of these problems see Edmund L. Pincoffs, Are Questions of Desert
Decidable?, in JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT 75 (William L. Blizek & J. B. Cederblom eds.,
1977).
42. DAVIS, supra note 2.

1993]

RETRIBUTIVE THEORY OF PARDONING?

tion of his views shows that he has not succeeded in moving beyond such abstract retributive principles or platitudes as these:
guilt is a necessary condition of punishment; convicted criminals
deserve to be punished; and the more grave the crime, the more
severe the deserved punishment. I have no quarrel with these
principles, assuming arguendo that punishment (both the practice
and its infliction in a particular case) is justified.4 3 But I do believe
that Davis's attempt to construct a penalty scale on purportedly
retributive principles fails for precisely the same reasons that von
44
Hirsch's original retributive theory has been shown to fail.
First, he recommends eliminating from the penalty scale "all inhumane penalties.

'45

I, too, would advocate such a prohibition.46

The problem with Davis's argument, however, is that his prohibition does not rest on any retributive ground. In fact, he gives no
retributive reason grounded in the defendant's desert to prohibit
the most savage penalties. Second, he proposes to construct the
retributive penalty scale by first listing in order of severity all punishments, then listing in a parallel fashion all crimes, and then
"connect[ing] the greatest penalty with the greatest crime

' 47

and

so on until every crime is matched with a punishment. I am willing
to grant that this can be done within certain broad limits; but it
provides no solution to the objections raised against the penalty
schedule constructed by von Hirsch and discussed above.4 1 Since

an infinite variety of valid penalty schedules can be constructed
that satisfy these requirements, it is preposterous to argue that because we chose a particular schedule, the offender deserves the
punishment that scale links to the offender's crime. Deserved punishments cannot be produced by any such arbitrary method as
this.
I submit that every known retributive theory can be shown to
suffer from the same problems that plagued von Hirsch in the
1970s and Davis in the 1990s.
43. See Hugo A. Bedau, Punitive Violence and Its Alternatives, in Justice, Law and Violence 193 (James B. Brady & Newton Garver eds., 1991).
44. See BEDAU, supra note 4.
45. DAvis, note 2, at 78-79.
46. See Hugo A. Bedau, The Eighth Amendment, Human Dignity, and the Death Penalty, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 145 (Michael

J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992).
47. DAvIs, supra note 2, at 78, 81-82.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
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Where does this leave us? What principles ought to guide the
exercise of executive clemency? Here I merely sketch out the answer. First, we can safely rule out obviously corrupt principles: No
one may be spared a judicially authorized punishment because the
offender's friends succeed in bribing the executive, and no one
seeking a pardon for an offender may fraudulently misrepresent to
the executive the circumstances surrounding the crime, the offender's prior record, etc. Second, we should not embrace vague
consequentialist principles, such as: Clemency in a particular case
is justified only (or always) on the ground that it will cause greater
net social welfare than leaving the offender's sentence unmodified.
The purpose of ruling out such principles is not to make room only
for desert-based principles. There is no reason a duly elected executive answerable to the public may not use judgment to invoke
whatever reasons, in light of the best understanding of the relevant
facts, make it appropriate to alleviate or terminate the offender's
punishment. The underlying principle ought to be this: It is better
to risk some social cost in order to extend mercy to an offender
than to risk unnecessary punitive deprivations by withholding
mercy. If desert-based clemency becomes the prevailing ideology,
just the reverse is likely to happen.

